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A shift away from Mao Zedong's concept of equality in the delivery of medical care is now
taking place in The People's Republic of China. This change is evident in the emphasis now
placed upon high technology, basic research, and hospital care. All of these changes are
occurring against the backdrop of extremely scarce medical resources. Medicine seemingly is
viewed as one of many material incentives to be provided high productivity and leadership
groups; the "modernization" of medicine is seen as one visible manifestation of the success of
the broader modernization effort itself. As well, population policy has become more stringent,
with rewards being given to one-child families and sanctions being applied against couples
having three or more children. Although these policy changes offer bright prospects for Sino-
American cooperation in the biomedical field, foreigners must remain sensitive to the con-
troversial nature of these alterations in the Chinese political setting.
INTRODUCTION
Where is the practice ofmedicine and public health in China heading, what arethe
implications ofpresent changes for the future, and what does allthis meanfor foreign
scientists and practitioners who desire to build a closer relationship with counterparts
in the Middle Kingdom? At the risk of some overstatement, a change in the ethical
base of the Chinese revolution now is occurring. This change is affecting the
distribution of health care and it is altering the standards guidingthedevelopment of
medicine in China. For Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung), the equal distribution ofbasic
medical services was the standard by which medicine and public health should be
judged. He believed that peasants, by virtue of their rural location, should not be
disadvantaged in receiving basic medical care. Because of the paucity of medical
resources and their prior concentration in the cities, Mao's Cultural Revolution
(1966-1969) value of equality translated into a requirement that manpower and
money be redistributed. Finances and human resources were diverted toward rural
areas and away from the cities and basic research.
In the wake of the Chairman's 1976 demise, different goals and values have come
to grip China: modernization and economic growth. Now, medicine is judged not
strictly by the egalitarian standard but by the degree to which medical science is,
itself, "modern" and by the degree to which it facilitates economic expansion. Health
services are now to be disproportionately available to those who contribute most to
modernization. The ethic of equity now reigns supreme. How have these rhetorical
changes been manifest in tangible policy?
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THE DIMENSIONS OF POST-MAO POLICY CHANGE
Health Care
China's leaders today face, as they have historically, two difficult questions: How
do we distribute scarce medical resources? How do we cope with the result of our
prior achievements-a growing population?
Even a cursory examination ofChina's Draft State Budget for 1979 reveals that the
money available for health care is exceedingly limited. As then Minister of Finance
Zhang Jingfu noted in June 1979, "Further increases in allocations will, in the final
analysis, depend on economic growth" [1]. While figures for per capita health
expenditures are subject to a significant margin ofuncertainty, myestimate is that all
governmental units down to the county (xian) levelspend between U.S. 8IC and U.S.
$1.36 per capita through the state health budget.' Although private, collective, union,
industrial, and other government agency expenditures on health and health-related
activities would increase this figure considerably, money is scarce. Speaking in
January 1980, Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-p'ing) acknowledged that
"Expenditures for education, science, culture and public health are too small and are
out of balance. There are even some Third World countries which have attached
more importance to this aspect than we have" [2].
Precisely because of monetary constraints, and Chairman Mao's commitment to
providing basic medical care to peasants, China's leadership initiated a series of
sweeping reforms during the 1965-1971 period. These reforms were designed to
augment the basic medical services provided ruralites. In order to accomplish this,
resources were drained away from the cities and away from basic research. To
provide augmented basic health services to peasants outside of the urban hospital
setting, medical education was reduced from five (and in some cases eight) years in
length to a maximum ofthree years. Paramedics("barefootdoctors") withanywhere
from three to six months oftraining were produced in large numbers; they allegedly
totalled 1.8 million by the mid-1970s. During the early 1970s, already understaffed
hospitals became furtherdepleted as the regime's policy ofsending one-third ofurban
doctors to rural areas took effect. Finally, while we have no hard budgetary figures,
throughout the early and mid-1970s, health authorities repeatedly made the undocu-
mented claim that increasing percentages of provincial health budgets were being
expended in "rural areas." The logic undergirding all of these efforts was simple.
Everyone was entitled to equal medical care and basic rural health services were
believed to be more "cost effective" than urban-focused, hospital-centered, medical
care. The payoffs from basic biomedical research were viewed as too long-term to
justify foregoing desperately needed clinical and preventive programs.
These Cultural Revolution changes had a number ofmedical, political, economic,
and scientific consequences. Medically, the quality of urban hospital care deterior-
ated. Facilities became ever more crowded, placed in a double bind ofmore referrals
from rural areas and reduced staffs to meet the load. The level of urban hygiene and
factory safety declined as well, with the Chinese now saying that "the hygienic
'The Draft State Budget for 1979 called for expenditures on "culture, education, health work and
science" of 12.08 billion yuan. At an exchange rate of 1.53yuan equals one U.S. dollar, this would be U.S.
$7.89 billion. Dividing this by China's population gives one a per capita expenditure of approximately
U.S. $8.13. In the 1950s, after the regime had consolidated its position, health expenditures accounted for
between 10 and not quite 17 percent of total expenditures for "culture, education, health work and
science." Assuming that today's percentage is within this range, per capita health expenditures budgeted
through this line item of the state budget would be about 81¢-$1.36.
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conditions in most cities are still not quite ideal. In some cities, they are no better
than in the 1950s" [3]. Politically, the reforms generated opposition among profes-
sionals, Party cadres decried the decline in services available to them, and urbanites
were displeased with deteriorating services too. All this, we're now told, hurt
productivity, innovation, and growth.
With these problems in mind, Mao's successors have systematically begun to alter
medical policy along a broad front, though Mao's imprint remains. During 1979,
China's medical leadership unveiled plans to modernize one-third ofChina's county
hospitals by 1985. To this end, the Draft State Budget for 1979 called for the
construction of 80,000 hospital beds in 1979 alone, almost as many hospital beds as
there were throughout China in 1949 [4]. Beijing (Peking) not only is utilizing
domestic resources to finance hospital construction, it also is looking abroad. In
October 1979, China was reported to have formally asked the Japanese for capital
assistance in building a 1,000-bed hospital [5]. Similarly, the well-known Chinese
surgeon Huang Jiasi recently visited America in search ofphilanthropic support for
the construction of centers of medical excellence.
This renewed emphasis upon hospital care has required changes in medical
education. While physicians with three years' academic medical training may have
been appropriate for delivering basic medical care in thevillages or countyhospitals,
such abbreviated training is now viewed as inadequate to meet the needs of urban
medical facilities. Older doctors trained in the 1940s and 1950s now frequently speak
of doctors trained during the Cultural Revolution with barely disguised derision. In
order to begin producing medical personnel who are seen as appropriate, medical
schools have lengthened their curricula to five years, with opportunities for postgrad-
uate specialty training being provided for the first time in well over a decade.
Conversely, barefoot doctors, much acclaimed during and after the Cultural Revolu-
tion, are now openly admonished to improve their skills. Too, there are indications
that there has been a reduction in the number of these paramedic personnel [6].
The trend toward hospital construction and longer medical education has brought
in its wake a renewed concern for advanced biomedical research and sophisticated
clinical procedures. For instance, organ transplants (heart and kidney) are now being
undertaken, and in 1978 a much publicized conference on artificial hearts was
convened. The trend toward basic research is also evident if one looks at budgetary
expenditures. The Draft State Budget for 1979 called for an increase of some 10
percent in expenditures for"science" over the year before. The entire budget line item
"culture, education, health work and science" was slated to increase only 7.2 percent
during the same period [7]. Concisely, China is determined to "modernize," with
modernization meaning urban, high-technology, and hospital-based medicaldelivery
built upon a foundation of basic biomedical research.
The trends described above must be placed in two important contexts: First,
changes in Chinese policy rhetoric frequently are more dramatic than the actual
changes which ultimately result. If change is not billed as "revolutionary" it seems
difficult to convince the geological layers ofChinese bureaucracy to take it seriously.
While there has been a relative (and important) shift in emphasis, the rural areas are
not being abandoned. Instead, there is a shift in priorities and, over the long run, this
shift will bring gains to some social sectors and losses to others. Doubtless, too, some
Chinese would argue that improving the urban medical system is in the long-term
interests of the peasantry.
Second, present health policy must be viewed in conjunction with the elite's
broader economic and political objectives. Mao's successors have now defined
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economic growth and "modernization" as their principal goals. To provide increased
incentives to high productivity sectors, health care is viewed as part of the overall
incentive package. Medical care is a material benefit to be provided professional,
leadership, and industrial groups in proportion to their presumed contribution to
state objectives. The principal of equity, not equality, is key. As well, "moderniza-
tion" means more thanjust economic growth-it means a visible demonstration that
China (as a cultural entity) is able to develop, manufacture, and use theworld's most
advanced technology.
David E. Rogers, M.D., and president of the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
of Princeton, NJ, delicately warned the Chinese Medical Association in August 1979
that,
Certain developing countries have found that almost the lion's share of their
health budget goes to staffing and maintaining their high technology hospitals
with little left over for basic immunizations, nutritional services, and the like.
To date, China has been virtually unique in avoiding this mistake.... Our
experience with the costs and the utility of certain procedures like coronary
bypass surgery, renal dialysis or the management of certain malignancies,
bears careful review as you move to modernize your system of medical care.
Many of us envy and admire China's ability to give basic health services to the
vast majority of its citizens. You should be proud of this accomplishment,
should guard it carefully, and should consider carefully how to protect this
system as you transport higher cost technologies when you, as with all other
nations, have limits to the financial resources you canapply to the problems of
medical care [8].
Population Policy
Ironically, the regime's widespread provision of basic public health and curative
services, in the context of three decades of relative civil calm, has contributed to an
enormous problem-China has an extremely large population with a great percen-
tage of the citizenryjust entering its prime childbearing years. According to Chinese
statistics, the national mortality rate is down from 28 per thousand population in the
immediate pre-1949 period to about 6-7 per thousand in 1979 [9]. Throughout the
1949-1979 period, the natural growth rate ofthe population averaged approximately
2 percent-a doubling time of 35 years. China's population is currently growing at
about 1.2 percent per annum [10]. A note of alarm recently has crept into the elite's
discussion of the population. Presently, every woman of childbearing age has an
average of 2.3 children during her reproductive life [11]. Were this rate to persist, by
the year 2000 China's population would be about 1.282 billion persons. This would
jeopardize capital accumulation and, in the end, the modernization effort itself.
China's population is bigger than in the past and the number of women of
child-bearing age is also greater. Unless population growth is brought under
control, the future birth rate will be much higher than in the past two or three
decades. What is more, most ofthose born from now on will be dependents by
the end of this century, using up large quantities ofsocialwealth and affecting
accumulation of capital [12].
Prior to his death, Chairman Mao's populist belief that people are solutions, not
problems, inhibited Beijing's leaders from initiating a stringent population program;
24CHANGING HEALTH POLICY IN THE POST-MAO ERA
the present elite has few such compunctions. In spring 1979, individual provinces
began to issue regulations on family size, regulations which differed in detail but were
similar in intent and method. Anhui Province, for instance, promulgated tough
regulations with "rewards" and"'sanctions" clearly spelled out. Couples who had only
one child (and were carrying out "effective birth control methods to insure that they
will not have a second") were to receive priority in obtaining schooling and medical
care for their child, were to be given the same housing floorspace as though they had
two children and, in rural areas, an only child was to receive an adult grain ration
[13]. Sanctions against three-child families (or two-child families previously rewarded
for having only one child) were to include: denial of additional ration coupons
(except for cloth) for the third child, denial of extra floorspace beyond that provided
two-child families, and no private plot space was to be provided the third child.
Finally, "couples who undergo sterilization operations and medical personnel who
have done well in performing such operations are to receive economic care and
reward" [14]. Although Anhui's regulations are not necessarily identical to those of
all other areas, Vice-Premier Chen Muhua set the tone for national policy in August
1979 when she declared,
Fast population growth has hampered the four modernizations and raising the
people's living standards.... People who refuse to be persuaded and insist on
having more children will be taxed [15].
In short, population growth is believed to inhibit economic expansion and those
who contribute most to solving this problem will be rewarded materially. By all
accounts, the rural birth rate is substantially higher than in urban areas. Conse-
quently, the uniform application of these sorts of regulations necessarily will mean
that peasants will more frequently receive sanctions than city dwellers. While one
cannot assume that the intimacy of village life will prove conducive to the strict
implementation of these policies, Beijing obviously is pursuing a policy which is
designed to reward those who contribute to economic growth and to punish those
who constitute an economic drag. These policies will impose the heaviest burdens
upon the peasants (if they are applied), those persons who tend to believe that having
more children is both a social and economic necessity.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PRESENT TRENDS FOR
SINO-AMERICAN COOPERATION
The trends discussed above have far-reaching implications for scientific coopera-
tion between China and America, particularly in the biomedical field. Indeed, the
June 1979 Sino-American agreement on "Cooperation in the Science and Technol-
ogy of Medicine and Public Health" would have been inconceivable had China not
been moving in the directions described above [16]. Just examining the topics
identified as priority areas for cooperation in the agreement reveals the thrust toward
professionalism and basic research. The following topics were identified as priority
foci for cooperation: infectious and parasitic diseases, cancer, cardiovascular dis-
eases, public health and health services research, medical information sciences,
immunology, and medical genetics. In these fields, China offers some exciting
prospects for joint collaboration and perhaps meaningful field research. The time is
ripe for American scientists of vision to initiatejoint research projects with Chinese
colleagues. For example, one promising area for joint research deals with the
environmental contributors to cancer. Because China has several regionally specific
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cancer types, it is possible to try to link variations in incidence to differences in local
conditions [17].
As we move into a closer cooperative relationship with the Chinese biomedical
establishment, however, we would be wise to remember that the present orientation
ofmedicine and public health in China, in theend, is a political issue; it is fragile. The
shift away from Mao's doctrine of equality toward policies based upon concepts of
equity will be advantageous to some groups and hurt others. It is hard to argue that
the basic health needs of China's peasants will immediately benefit from massive
investments in pure research-perhaps in the long run, but certainly not immediately.
Consequently, by becoming intimately tied to the basic research and high-technology
focus of present policy, America could in the future find itself, once again, accused of
promoting policies harmful to China's less fortunate citizens.
Does this mean that we ought to hold back in our dealings with the Chinese? I
think not. It does, however, suggest that American scientists, doctors, and public
health workers need to try, at every opportunity, to encourage China to adopt
appropriate technologies and to focus on those areas which offer the brightest
prospect for meeting its citizens' basic needs. This need not lead to a rejection of
advanced technology, but only to the creative and thoughtful application of that
technology to problems that mostChinese citizens would concede are genuine. This is
the most solid foundation upon which we can build a hopefully enduring relation-
ship.
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